# Halting and Equivalence of Schemes over Recursive Theories

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#### Abstract

Let  $\Sigma$  be a fixed first-order signature. In this note we consider the following decision problems.

- (i) Given a recursive ground theory T over  $\Sigma$ , a program scheme p over  $\Sigma$ , and input values specified by ground terms  $t_1, \ldots, t_n$ , does p halt on input  $t_1, \ldots, t_n$  in all models of T?
- (ii) Given a recursive ground theory T over  $\Sigma$  and two program schemes p and q over  $\Sigma$ , are p and q equivalent in all models of T?

When T is empty, these two problems are the classical halting and equivalence problems for program schemes, respectively. We show that problem (i) is r.e.-complete and problem (ii) is  $\Pi_2^0$ -complete. Both these problems remain hard for their respective complexity classes even if T is empty and  $\Sigma$  is restricted to contain only a single constant, a single unary function symbol, and a single monadic predicate. It follows from (ii) that there can exist no relatively complete deductive system for scheme equivalence.

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Let  $\Sigma$  be a fixed first-order signature. A ground formula over  $\Sigma$  is a Boolean combination of atomic formulas  $P(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$  of  $\Sigma$ , where the  $t_i$  are ground terms (no occurrences of variables). A ground theory over  $\Sigma$  is a consistent set of ground formulas closed under entailment. A set E of ground formulas is a complete extension of a ground theory T if E contains T and each ground formula or its negation appears in E.

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**Theorem 0.1** The following problem is r.e.-complete: Given a recursive ground theory T over  $\Sigma$ , a program scheme p over  $\Sigma$ , and input values specified by ground terms  $\overline{t} = t_1, \ldots, t_n$ , does p halt on input  $\overline{t}$  in all models of T? The problem remains r.e.-hard even if  $T = \emptyset$  and  $\Sigma$  is restricted to contain only a single constant, a single unary function symbol, and a single monadic predicate.

**Theorem 0.2** The following problem is  $\Pi_2^0$ -complete: Given a recursive ground theory T over  $\Sigma$  and two schemes p and q over  $\Sigma$ , are p and q equivalent in all models of T? The problem remains  $\Pi_2^0$ -hard even if  $T = \emptyset$  and  $\Sigma$  is restricted to contain only a single constant, a single unary function symbol, and a single monadic predicate.

When  $T=\varnothing$ , these are the classical halting and equivalence problems for program schemes. Note that for the upper bounds, the recursive theory T is part of the input. Classical lower bound proofs (see [1]) establish the r.e. hardness of the two problems for the case  $T=\varnothing$ . The  $\Pi_2^0$ -hardness of the second problem in the case  $T=\varnothing$  can also be shown to follow without much difficulty from a result of [2].

Proof of Theorem 0.1. Let T be a recursive ground theory. It suffices to restrict our attention to Herbrand models of T. These models are in one-to-one correspondence with the complete extensions of T.

First we show that the problem is r.e. Given p and  $\overline{t}$ , we simulate the computation of  $\mathbf{p}$  on input  $\bar{t}$  on all Herbrand models of T simultaneously, using the decidability of T to resolve tests. Each branch of the simulation maintains a finite set E of ground atomic formulas consistent with T, initially empty. Whenever a test  $P(s_1, \ldots, s_k)$  is encountered, we consult T and E to determine which branch to take. If the truth value of  $P(s_1,\ldots,s_k)$  is determined by T and E, that is, if  $T \models E \rightarrow P(u_1, \dots, u_k)$  or  $T \models E \rightarrow \neg P(u_1, \dots, u_k)$ , where the ground term  $u_i$  is the current value of  $s_i$ ,  $1 \le i \le k$ , then we just take the appropriate branch. Otherwise, if both  $P(u_1,\ldots,u_k)$  and  $\neg P(u_1,\ldots,u_k)$ are consistent with  $T \cup E$ , then the simulation branches, extending E with  $P(u_1,\ldots,u_k)$  on one branch and  $\neg P(u_1,\ldots,u_k)$  on the other. In each simulation step, all current branches are simulated for one step in a round-robin fashion. We thus simulate the computation of p on all possible complete extensions of T simultaneously. If p halts on all such extensions, then by König's Lemma there is a uniform bound on the halting time of all branches of the computation. The simulation halts successfully when that bound is discovered.

We now show that the problem is r.e.-hard in the restricted case  $\Sigma = \{a, f, P\}$ , where a is a constant, f is a unary function symbol, and P is a unary relation symbol. We will encode the halting problem for deterministic Turing machines. Given a deterministic Turing machine M and a string x over M's input alpha-

bet, we will construct a scheme p with no input or output and a finite atomic theory T such that p halts on all complete extensions of T iff M halts on input x. The encoding technique used here is fairly standard, but we include the argument for completeness and because we need the resulting scheme p in a certain special form for the proof of Theorem 0.2.

The Herbrand domain over a and f is isomorphic to the natural numbers with 0 and successor. An Herbrand model H over this domain is represented by an infinite binary string whose  $n^{\text{th}}$  digit is 1 iff  $P(f^n(a))$  in H. The correspondence is one-to-one. We will use these strings to encode computation histories of M.

Each string x over M's input alphabet determines a unique finite or infinite computation history  $\#\alpha_0^x\#\alpha_1^x\#\alpha_2^x\#\cdots$ , where  $\alpha_i^x$  is a string over a finite alphabet  $\Delta$  encoding the instantaneous configuration of M on input x at time i (tape contents, head position, current state). The configurations  $\alpha_i^x$  are separated by a symbol  $\# \not\in \Delta$ . The computation history in turn can be encoded in binary. Finally, an infinite binary string can be encoded by the truth values of  $P(f^n(a))$  for successive n.

The ground theory T describes the starting configuration  $\#\alpha_0^x\#$  of M on input x. Thus T consists of finitely many ground atomic formulas. Any complete extension of T describes either the unique valid computation history of M on input x or a garbage string. The scheme  $\mathfrak{p}$  can read the  $n^{\text{th}}$  bit of this string in the corresponding Herbrand model by testing the value of  $P(f^n(a))$ . It starts by scanning the initial part of the string to check that it is of the form  $\#\alpha_0^y\#$  for some y. (This step is not strictly necessary for this proof, since we are restricting our attention to models of T, in which this step will always succeed; but it will be useful later in the proof of Theorem 0.2.) Next,  $\mathfrak{p}$  scans the string from left to right to determine whether each successive  $\alpha_{i+1}^x$  follows from  $\alpha_i^x$  in one step according to the transition rules of M. It does this by comparing corresponding bits in  $\alpha_i^x$  and  $\alpha_{i+1}^x$  using two variables to simulate pointers into the string. If the current value of variable x is  $f^n(a)$ , then testing P(x) reads the nth bit of the string. The pointer is advanced by the assignment x := f(x).

If  ${\sf p}$  discovers an error, so that the string does not represent a computation history of M on some input, it halts immediately. It also halts if it ever encounters a halting state of M anywhere in the string. Thus the only complete extension of T that would cause  ${\sf p}$  not to halt is the one describing the valid computation history of M on x in the case that M does not halt on x. Thus  ${\sf p}$  halts on all complete extensions of T iff M halts on x.

We can further restrict to  $T = \emptyset$  by observing that the T in this construction is finite, so it can be hard-wired into the scheme p itself. Thus the initial format check that p performs can be modified to check whether T holds and

halt immediately if not. However, for purposes of the proof of Theorem 0.2 below, it will be important that  ${\sf p}$  not depend on the input x but only on the machine M.  $\square$ 

Proof of Theorem 0.2. Two schemes are equivalent over all models of T iff they are equivalent over all Herbrand models of T. As above, each Herbrand model of T is uniquely represented by a complete extension of T.

First we show that equivalence of schemes over models of T is  $\Pi_2^0$ . Equivalently, inequivalence of schemes over models of T is  $\Sigma_2^0$ . It suffices to show that inequivalence of schemes over models of T can be determined by an IND program over  $\mathbb{N}$  with an  $\exists \forall$  alternation structure [3].

The two schemes p and q are not equivalent over models of T iff there exists an Herbrand model H of T and input values  $\overline{t} = t_1, \ldots, t_n$  such that when interpreted over H, either

- (i) both p and q halt on input  $\overline{t}$  and produce different output values;
- (ii) p halts on  $\overline{t}$  and q does not; or
- (iii) q halts on  $\overline{t}$  and p does not.

We start by selecting existentially the input  $\bar{t}$  and the alternative (i), (ii) or (iii) to check.

If alternative (i) was selected, we simulate  ${\bf p}$  and  ${\bf q}$  on input  $\overline{t}$ , maintaining a finite set E of ground atomic formulas and using T and E as in the proof of Theorem 0.1 to resolve tests. Whenever a test is encountered that is not determined by T and E, we guess the truth value and extend E accordingly. Thus we are nondeterministically guessing the model H as we go along. This is done by existential branching in the IND program. We continue the simulation until both  ${\bf p}$  and  ${\bf q}$  halt, then compare output values, accepting if they differ.

If alternative (ii) was selected, we simulate p on  $\overline{t}$  until it halts, maintaining the guessed truth values of undetermined tests in the set E as above. When p has halted, we have a consistent extension  $T \cup E$  of T, where E consists of the finitely many tests that were guessed during the computation of p. So far we have only used existential branching. We must now verify that there exists a complete extension of  $T \cup E$  in which q does not halt on input  $\overline{t}$ . By Theorem 0.1, this problem is  $\Pi_1^0$ -complete, so we can solve it with a purely universally-branching IND computation.

The argument for alternative (iii) is symmetric.

For the lower bound, we reduce the totality problem for Turing machines, a well-known  $\Pi_2^0$ -complete problem, to the equivalence problem. The totality problem is to determine whether a given Turing machine M halts on all inputs.

As above, it will suffice to consider  $T = \emptyset$  and  $\Sigma = \{a, f, P\}$ .

Given a deterministic Turing machine M, we construct two schemes  $\mathbf{p}$  and  $\mathbf{q}$  with no input or output that are equivalent iff M halts on all inputs. The scheme  $\mathbf{p}$  is the one constructed in the proof of Theorem 0.1. As in that proof, each input string x over M's input alphabet determines a unique computation history, and the scheme  $\mathbf{p}$  checks that the Herbrand model in which it is running encodes a valid computation history of M on some input.

Now unlike the proof of Theorem 0.1, there is an extra source of non-halting. Recall that there is an initial format check in which  $\mathbf{p}$  checks that the string has a prefix of the form  $\#\alpha_0^x\#$  for some x. If there is no second occurrence of # in the string, then  $\mathbf{p}$  will loop infinitely looking for it. If it does detect a second occurrence of #, then as before, the only source of non-halting is if M does not halt on x. We therefore build  $\mathbf{q}$  to simply check for a prefix of the form  $\#\alpha_0^x\#$  exactly as  $\mathbf{p}$  does and halt immediately when it encounters the second occurrence of #. Thus  $\mathbf{p}$  does not halt in the Herbrand model H iff the string represented by H either

- (i) does not have a prefix of the form  $\#\alpha_0^x\#$ , or
- (ii) does have a prefix of the form  $\#\alpha_0^x\#$  and represents a non-halting computation history of M on x;

and q does not halt in H in case (i) only. Therefore p and q are equivalent iff M halts on all inputs.  $\square$ 

In [4], axioms were proposed for reasoning equationally about input/output relations of first-order program schemes over  $\Sigma$ . These axioms have been shown to be adequate for some fairly intricate equivalence arguments arising in program optimization [4,5]. However, unlike the propositional case, it follows from Theorem 0.2 that there can exist no finite relatively complete axiomatization for first-order scheme equivalence. If such an axiomatization did exist, then the scheme equivalence problem over a given first-order theory T would be r.e. in T. But it is decidable whether a given first-order sentence  $\varphi$  is a consequence of a given finite set E of ground formulas over the signature  $\Sigma = \{a, f, P\}$ , since  $E \models \varphi$  iff  $E \to \varphi$  is a valid sentence of the first-order theory of a one-to-one unary function with monadic predicate, a well-known decidable theory [6] (note that every  $\Sigma$ -structure is elementarily equivalent to one in which the interpretation of f is one-to-one). By Theorem 0.2, the scheme equivalence problem relative to E is  $\Pi_2^0$ -hard, therefore not r.e. in the decidable first-order theory generated by E.

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