Monday, November 12, 2007 4:00 PM 5130 Upson Hall |
Theory Seminar Fall 2007 CS 789 |
|
---|---|---|
Tal Rabin |
||
Information-Theoretically Secure Protocols and Security Under Composition |
||
We investigate the question of whether security of
protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is
computationally unbounded) implies the security of these protocols under
concurrent composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that
all known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting
are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to
this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering
perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with
adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of
what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as
providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for
proving the security of protocols under composition while considering
only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.
Joint work with Eyal Kushilevitz and Yehuda Lindell |