

Lecture 17:  
CS 5306 / INFO 5306:  
Crowdsourcing and  
Human Computation

*Human Computation*, Chapter 6  
The Art of Asking Questions

“the design of tasks ... can influence the way human computers compute – motivating them to tell the truth, enhancing (or degrading) the quality of their outputs or making them reach an answer faster”

# Points of Intervention for Quality Control

- Before computation:  
routing tasks to the right worker
- After computation:  
appropriate aggregation and filtering
- During computation:  
“safeguards placed *at* the time of computation”

# Elements of a Task

Task = “an actual piece of work ... that is performed by a human worker”

# Elements of a Task

- Basic information:
  - Inputs
  - What is being computed / the question being asked
  - Allowable outputs
- Conditions for success:
  - ESP Game: words match
- Incentives:
  - ESP Game: 10 points per match

# Task Design Decisions

1. Information given to the worker:
  - Task performance is influenced by the information presented to workers
  - Quality of instructions (precise? unambiguous? ...)
  - Do workers get value from seeing other workers' solutions?

# Task Design Decisions

## 2. Granularity of task:

- Is the task well-defined or too large – should it be decomposed into simpler subtasks?
- Will workers understand the task in the “right” way to compute the intended function?

## 3. Independence:

- Will workers do works independently?
- Can workers communicate? ... collaborate?
  - If yes, how?



# Task Design Decisions

## 4. Incentives:

- Are you paying enough?
- Are workers being given suitable motivation to work “to the best of their abilities”?

## 5. Quality control:

- Is the work correct?

# Task Information

“There are plenty of psychology experiments that show that human subjects can be systematically biased by how a question is presented and what information is included”

# Task Information

“The list of cognitive biases is long .. But there has been little research on the effects they have on the way workers perform computational tasks”

# Relevant Cognitive Biases

- Anchoring:
  - Estimating  $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 \times 7 \times 8$   
versus  $8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1$
- Language: Ask a farmer a question in terms of produce
- Sequential context biases: Preceding answer impacts next answer
  - Intensities of answers are connected
  - Example: If previous images was pretty or ugly, affects answer to attractiveness of next image

# Information as Assistance / Bias

- Partial solutions
  - Example: Initial configuration in Foldit
  - Example: Iterative improvement algorithms
  - Example: Earlier information biases subsequent answers, such as in answer length or vocabulary used

# Task Granularity

- Example: Clustering using human assessment of similarity
- “Adaptively learning the crowd kernel”, Tamuz, O., Liu, C., Belongie, S., Shamir, O., & Kalai, A. T., Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2011

# Task Granularity

- Example: Cluster these ties in subsets that are similar



# Task Granularity

- Clustering using human assessment of similarity
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
# Task Granularity

- Clustering using human assessment of similarity
- “Adaptively learning the crowd kernel”, Tamuz, O., Liu, C., Belongie, S., Shamir, O., & Kalai, A. T., Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2011
  - Use: Is A more like B or C?

# Task Granularity

- Clustering using human assessment of similarity
- “Crowdclustering”, Gomes, R. G., Welinder, P., Krause, A., & Perona, P., *Advances in neural information processing systems* (pp. 558-566), 2011
  - Give  $M \ll N$  items, ask worker to cluster them

# Task Granularity



# Task Granularity

- Soylent: Find, Fix, Verify
- Iterative improvement algorithm

# Task Independence

“While it is common practice that workers perform tasks alone, there are new platforms emerging that will allow workers to perform tasks by interacting with each other”

# Task Independence

“While it is common practice that workers perform tasks alone, there are new platforms emerging that will allow workers to perform tasks by interacting with each other”

- No mention of *Infotopia*-like results
- What does task routing look like for a group?

# Incentives

- Incentives can impact:
  - Whether workers do any task
  - Which tasks workers do
  - How well they perform the tasks that they do
- Questions:
  1. Form of incentive
  2. How much incentive
  3. Resistance to manipulation

# Incentive Taxonomy

- Extrinsic motivation: money, virtual rewards
- Intrinsic motivation:
  - Power: “desire to influence”
  - Curiosity: “to know”
  - Status: “social standing”
  - Social contact: “companionship and play”
  - Competition: “get even”
  - Idealism: “improve society”
  - Ownership: “to collect”



# Incentive Taxonomy, Simplified

- Tom Malone, MIT:

Glory

Love

Money

# Incentives

- “The interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is complex”
- Example: Paying to do a task can decrease subsequent internal motivation for the task
- Example: “target earner”
  - Compensated after reaching some milestone
  - Make progress easy to visualize (example: multiple of 5)

# Quality Control

- Task design: So the correctness of the worker's "output" can be checked for correctness
  - Verification: Compare to known answer
  - Voting: Select best
  - Filtering: Vote out worst
  - Merging: Combine work to smooth out differences

Use multiple workers

# Quality Control

- Social forces and protocols
  - Social norms
  - Sanctions
  - Legal contracts
  - Promise of future work based on performance
  - Sense of community

# Quality Control

- Add another question that doesn't change the amount of work by much but that you know the answer to
- Provide signals to workers that they are being monitored
- Put verifiable question before subjective one
  - Dropped incorrect responses by 43%

# Quality Control: Eliciting Truthful Responses

- Game Theory:
  - Example: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions
  - “Incentive compatible”: bidders cannot do better by misreporting their true valuation of an item

# Quality Control: Eliciting Truthful Responses

- Games with a purpose
  - Output agreement: ESP Game:
  - Input agreement: TagATune
  - Inversion problems: Peekaboom
  - Complementary agreement: Polarity