

3 May 2024

Discrete Log & Diffie-Hellman

Announcements: Pre-enroll for Fall '24 began yesterday.

- Bowers CIS new AI Minor

4780	}	$\lambda_x \cdot x - 1000$
4700		
STSCI 4740		

- CS 6820. Enrollment will be open to undergrads.
[Pre-enrollment is not?]

"One-Way Function": easy to compute
hard to invert.

↳ Given x , finding x'
st. $f(x') = f(x)$ is
hard on average over
random $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

Modular exponentiation.

Given g, x, N , compute $g^x \pmod{N}$,

Repeated multiplication takes $\Omega(x) = \Omega(2^n)$

in n is # of bits in binary
representation of x .

To compute $g^x \pmod{N}$:

if x even:

compute $g^{x/2} \pmod{N}$
square it recursively.

if x odd:

compute g^{x-1}

Square it

multiply by g .

If x has n bits,

$$T(n) = T(n-1) + O(n \log n)$$

$$T(n) = O(n^2 \log n)$$

The inverse operation is the discrete log.

Given N and g and $g^x \pmod{N}$

find x .

Can again solve by repeated multiplication.

Repeated squaring doesn't work this time.

In fact, we believe discrete log is computationally hard (for classical computers).

We will be using g, N such that

$$g^p \equiv 1 \pmod{N} \text{ for } p \text{ prime.}$$

In general, define the order of $g \pmod{N}$ to be the least d s.t. $g^d \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$.

Powers of g : $1, g, g^2, g^3, \dots, g^d, g^{d+1}, g^{d+2}, \dots$

$\parallel \quad \parallel \quad \parallel$
 $1 \quad g \quad g^2$

The sequence repeats with period d and the remainder 1 appears as $g^x \pmod{N}$ if and only if x is divisible by d .

Sophie Germain primes.

p is a Sophie Germain prime if $q = 2p + 1$ is also prime.

FACT. If $p, q = 2p + 1$ are both prime, the order of 4 (mod q) is p .

Proof. $4^p = 2^{2p} = 2^{q-1} = \frac{1}{2} (2^q)$

$$2^q = \sum_{i=0}^q \binom{q}{i} \quad \binom{q}{i} = \binom{q}{q-i}$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^p \binom{q}{i} + \sum_{i=p+1}^q \binom{q}{i} \quad \rightarrow \text{These are equal}$$

$$4^p = 2^{q-1} = \sum_{i=0}^p \binom{q}{i} = \sum_{i=0}^p \frac{q!}{i!(q-i)!}$$

$$\equiv 1 \pmod{q}$$

← divisible by q except $i=0$

The order of 4 is a divisor of p .

It's not 1, so it must be p .

Diffie Hellman key agreement

Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel. Eve (attacker) listens.


Goal: A, B agree on an n -bit secret without Eve knowing the secret. (Unless Eve computes discrete log.)

Protocol. Alice chooses p, q (prime).
 g such that $g^p \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$.

Sends (p, g, g) to Bob in public.

Alice picks secret, $a \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$.

Bob picks secret, $b \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$.



They use g^{ab} as their secret key.

We believe g^{ab} is hard to compute, given g^a and g^b . (Diffie-Hellman assumption).

Public-Key Crypto.

The communication channel is public. The key to encrypt messages is also public.

Alice generates (randomly) a pair of keys.

pk = public key used for encryption

sk = secret key -- -- decryption.

Goal. Anyone (Bob, Eve, whoever) can easily encrypt msgs to Alice.
 No one can easily decrypt without knowing sk.

$$g^p \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$$

$$PK = (p, q, g, A = g^a) \quad sk = a$$

Encryption. Sample $b \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$

$$B = g^b \pmod{q}$$

$$Enc(pk, m) = (B, A^b \cdot m)$$

Decryption. Receive (B, C) .

Know $\exists b$ st.

$$B = g^b$$

$$C = g^{ab} \cdot m$$

Alice computes

$$B^{(p-1)a} \cdot A^b \cdot m \cdot C$$

$$= g^{b(p-1)a} g^{ab} \cdot m = g^{pab} \cdot m = m$$

\pmod{q}

ElGamal public-key encryption.